IN RE CoOPER
[53 C.2d [Crim. No. 6510. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] In re GEORGE COOPER, on Habeas Corpus. [Crim. No. 6511. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] In re ABE S. TOBEROFF, on Habeas Corpus. [Crim. No. 6572. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] In re EDWIN D. RICH, on Habeas Corpus. [Crim. No. 6573. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] In re ALBERT G. JEFFERIES, on Habeas Corpus. [Crim. No. 6574. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] In re FLOYD L. CLEMENS, on Habeas Corpus. [Crim. No. 6575. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1960.] In re RALPH LEVERSON, on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Extradition -Uniform Oriminal Extradition Act -OonstitutionaJity.-Pen. Code, § 1549.1 (part of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act), authorizing apprehension and extradition to another state of one who has, either in this state or a third state, committed an act intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is demanding the extradition, is not invalid as violating the Constitution or statutes of the United States. The federal constitutional and statutory provisions are not exclusive, and the states are free to cooperate with one another by extending interstate rendition beyond that required by federal law. [2] Id.-Uniform Criminal Extra.dition Act-Persons Extra.ditable.
-A criminal who acts in one state to commit crimes in another may pose a far more serious problem to the latter state than one who commits a crime there and then fiees from justice, and the Legislature validly enacted Pen. Code, § 1549.1 (a part of the Uniform Criminal Extraoition Act), to pre .... ent the state's unwitting provision of an asylum for those who commit Code, 11548.2, provides that the essential .facts supporting a demand for extradiction may be charged either by an indictmeot, an information or by an affidavit made before a magistrate, it is immaterial that indictments for distributing and advertising obscene literature did not allege the commission of acts in this state resulting in crimes in the demanding state, where such allegations were expressly set forth in the accompanying affidavits made before a magistrate by an investigator of the district attorney's oftlce.
[4] Id.-Dema.nd-Su1IicienC)' of Charge or Afticla.vit.-Since the purpose of affidavits to support extradition is not to secure immediate arrests but to convince the respective Governors that extradition is justified, it is immaterial that the magistrate did not act on the affidavits by issuing warrants. Pen. Code, § 1548.2, does not require that a warrant accompany a demand based on an affidavit, but only that "any warrant which was issued thereon" be included.
[6] Id.-Demand-Su1IicienC)' of Oharge or Aftida.vit.-Though affidavits on information and belief accompanying-a demand for extradition do not set forth the amants' sources of information or reasons for belief that petitioners had committed the offenses charged, the PUfpose of the requirement that they do so is fully met when the indictments, also accompanying the demand and charging distribution of obscene literature and related offenses, establish reasonable cause to believe petitioners guilty of the offenses charged and the affidavits are based on petitioners' California activities (resulting in crimes committed in another state), it being presumed that sufficient evidence was presented to the grand jury to support the indictments. TRAYNOR, J.-By petitions for writs of habeas corpus petitioners challenge the validity of proceedings to extradite them to Pennsylvania to stand trial for the distribution of obscene literature and related offenses. We issued orders to show cause direct.ed to the sheriff of Los Angeles County and ordered petitioners released on bail. In his return the sheriff alleges that he took custody of petit.ioners pursuant to extradition warrants issued by the Governor of California. Copies of the warrants were filed with the return, and the original supporting papers from the Governor of Pennsylvania to the Governor of California were lodged with the court and a motion made that they be filed. These documents disclose that petitioners were indicted for crimes committed in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. Three petitioners were indicted for distributing and advertising obscene literature, and three for distributing and conspiring to distribute such literature. [2] Modern communication and transportation facilitate the commission of crimes across state lines. A criminal who acts in one state to commit crimes in another may pose a far more serious problem to the latter state than one who commits a crime there and then flees from justice. When the criminal who commits his crime entirely in one state flees, he ordinarily poses no threat of additional crimes therein; if extradition fails, there is only frustration of that state's interest in punishing him. In contrast, the criminal who operates from without the state's borders poses a continuing threat. Since his conduct may be undetected or apparently harmless in the state where he acts, the only effective impetus for prosecution may come from the state that suffers the harm. Far more divisive than a state's refusal to extradite a fugitive for a past offense would be its unwitting provision not only of a base of operation but of an asylum for those who commit crimes without being personally present at the place where their crimes are consummated. The Legislature validly enacted section 1549.1 to prevent that result.
Section 1549.1 provides that "The Governor of this State may also surrender, on demand of the executive authority of any other State, any person in this State charged in such other State in the manner provided in section 1548.2 of this code with committing an act in this State, Or in a third State, intentionally resulting in a crime in the State whose executive authority is making the demand. . . ." Section 1548.2 provides that the demand "shall be accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by information or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate in the demand-ing State together with a copy of allY warrant which was issued thereon. . . ." In the present cases, each demand it> accompanied by an indictment charging the defendant named therein with committing crimes in Pennsylvania and an affidavit made before a magistrate by an investigator of the district attorney's office. The affidavits are titled" Criminal Complaint for Warrant of Arrest" and the facts stated are set forth as "true and correct according to the best of [the affiant's] knowledge, information and belief." They describe petitioners' distribution of obscene literature in Pennsylvania by mail from California and each contains a paragraph in substantially the following form: "Deponent further avers that, by reason of the said act and acts of depositing the said literature and written and printed matter in the United States Mail for delivery and distribution to the said private citizens in and about the said City and County of Philadelphia, and well knowing and intending that the said literature would be so delivered and distributed, the said FLoYD CLEJrlMENS did do such act and acts in the said State of California which intentionally resulted in the commission of the crime of Distributing Obscene Literature in the said City and County of Philadelphia as prohibited by the Act of the General Assembly of this Commonwealth, and which is against the peace and dignity of this Commonwealth."
[3] Since section 1548.2 provides that the essential facts may be charged either by an indictment, an information, or by an affidavit made before a magistrate, it is immaterial that the indictments did not allege the commission of acts in this state intentionally resulting in crimes in Pennsylvania. Such allegations were expressly set forth in the affidavits.
[4] It is contended, howcver, that the affidavits are insufficient on the ground that the magistrate did not act on them by issuing warrants. Since the purpose of affidavits to support extradition is not to secure immediate arrests but to convince the respective Governors that extradition is justmed, it is immaterial that the magistrate did not act on the affidavits. Morgan, 20 F. 298, 307 .) The affidavits do not set forth the affiants' sources of information or reasons for belief that petitioners had committed the offenses charged, but the purpose of the requirement that they do so is fully met when as in these cases the indictments establish reasonable cause to believe petitioners guilty of the offenses charged and the affidavits demonstrate that the indictments are based on petitioners' California activities. Thus in each case the affidavit and indictment dovetail to meet the requirements of sections 1549.1 and 1548.2. The affiants and other witnesses appeared before the grand jury. Since it is undisputed that at all relevant times petitioners have been in California, the indictments are obviously based on petitioners' mail-order businesses conducted from this state and concern the very criminal transactions set forth in the affidavits. It must be presumed that sufficient evidence was presented to the grand jury to support the indictments, and as prosecuting witnesses the affiants knew of their own knowledge that the indictments were based on petitioners' California activities. Under such circumstances the respective Governors were bound to know . that the indictments were based on petitioners' activities set . forth in the affidavits, including their acts in California intentionally resulting in crimes in Pennsylvania.
[6] Sections 1549.1 and 1548.2 do not provide that the indictment alone or the affidavit alone must sufficiently allege all of the facts necessary to support extradition under section 1549.1. To add such a provision would exalt form over substance. [ 7 ] Protection from Wljustified extradition does not lie in reading into the extradition laws purely technical requirements that a forewarned prosecutor could easily meet, but in the sound judgment of the respective Governors charged with the administration of those laws. Their judgment is entitled to great weight. [8] As the United States Supreme Court stated, in reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit to support extradition pursuant to federal law, "When it appears, as it does here, that the affidavit in question was regarded by the executive authority' of the respective States concerned as a sufficient basis, in law, for their acting-the one in making a requisition, the other in issuing a warrant for the arrest of the alleged fugitive-the judiciary should not interfere, on habeas corpus, and discharge the accused, upon technical grounds, and unless it be clear that what was done was in plain contravention of law. '''Whoever gives or participates in, or being the owner of any premo ises, or having control thereof, permits within or on said premises, any , dramatic, theatrical, operatic, or vaudeville exhibition, or the exhibition of fixed or moving pictures, of a lascivious, sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, or immoral nature and charaeter, or such as might tend to corrupt morals, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be sen· tenced to pay a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars (t500), or undergo ' inlprisonment for a period not exceeding one (1) year, or both. 1939, June 24, PL. 872, ~ 528." "'Whoever sells, lends, distributes, exhibits, gives away, or shows or offers to sell, lend, distribute, exhibit, or give away or show, or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute or give away or to show, or knowingly advertises in any manner, any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, storypaper, paper, writing, drawing, pLotograph, figure or image, or any written or printed matter of an ind"ecnt character, or any article or instrument of indecent or immoral use or purponing to be for indecent or immoral use or purpose, or whoever designs, copies, draws, photographs, prints, utters, publishes, or in any manner manufactures or prepares any such book, picture, drawing, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, storypaper, paper, writing, figure, image, matter, article or thing, or whoever writes, prints, publishes or utters, or causes to be printed, published or uttered, any advertisement or notiee of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, stating or purporting to do so, where, '" Obscene Werature consists of any writing, or printed matter, picture, inmge, drawing, figure, photograph or other pictorial representation, which is uurel:Jtcd to sciene,e, art or scientific study, and taken as a whole is indecent, lewd, lascivious, and has the effect of inciting to lewdness or sexual crime. 'Whoever sells, lends, distributes, exhibits, gil"cS away, or shows or of! ers to sell, lend, distribute, exhibit, or give away or show, or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute or give away or to show, or knowingly advertises in any manner, any obscene literature or lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting book, magazine, pam· phlet, newspaper, storypaper, paper, writing, drawing, photograph, figure or image, or any written or printed matter of an indecent character, or any article or instrument of indecent or immoral use or purporting to be for indecent or immoral usc or purpose, or whoever designs, copies, draws, photographs. prints, utters, publishes, or in any manner manufactures or prepares any such book, picture, drawing, magazine, pamphlet, news· paper, storypaper, paper, writing, figure, image, matter, article or thing, or whoen'r writes, prints, publishes or utters, or causes to be printed, published or utt.cred, any advertisement or notiee of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, stating or purporting to do so, where, ltOw, of wl,om, or by what means any, or what purports to be, any ob· s~enE', lewd, lascivious, filthy, disgusting or indecent book, picture, writ· ing, paper, figure, image, matter, article or thing named in this section can he plJr<·ha.ed, obtained or had, or whoever prints, utters, publishes, sells, lend,;, gives away, or 81,ow8, or has in his possession with intent to scli, knd. give away, or show, or otherwise offers for pale, loan or gift, or distribution, any pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper de\'oted to the publication and principally made up of criminal news, polirE' reports or 8C'('ounts of criminal deeds, or pictures of stories of dE'E'ds of bloodshed, lust or crime, or whoever hires, employs, lIses or permits :my minor or ehihl to do or assist in doing any act or thing mentioned in this section, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction, shall be sentenced to imprisonment not ('xeeeding two (2) years, or to pay a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars (E'!WOO), or both. , is not to the contrary, for in that case the state court had interpreted the ordinance there involved as eliminating knowledge of the character of the proscribed literature as an element of the offense, and it was only as so interpreted that the Supreme Court held the ordinance void.
Petitioners contend, however, that the Pennsylvania Legislature has recognized the invalidity of section 4524 as it read at the times here relevant by amending it in 1959 to set forth the standard of obscenity approved in the Roth and Alberts cases. The effect of the 1959 amendment on prosecutions commenced prior to its date is a question for the Pennsylvania courts, and we find no basis for concluding that that amendment absolved petitioners of responsibility for violations alleged to have occurred before its date.
Petitioners' contention that the Pennsylvania statute may not be applied to their mail-order business on the ground that Congress preempted the field by enacting the federal statute punishing the mailing or advertising by mail of obscene material (18 U.S.C.A., § 1461) was answered adversely to them in the Alberts case. (354 U.S. 476, 493-494.) The motion to file the lodged documents is granted. The orders to show cause are discharged, the petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied, and petitioners are remanded to custody.
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and White, J., concurred. SCHAUER, J.-Although I agree that the interpretation, application, and constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute under which petitioners have been indicted are questions (at least initially) for the Pennsylvania courts, I cannot agree that the papers which accompany the Pennsylvania demands for extradition are sufficient to support such demands. In the case of each petitioner the only averment in such papers that he committed "an act in this State . . . intentionally resulting in a crime in the States whose executive authority is making the demand" (Pen. Code, § 1549.1) is in the "Criminal Complaint for "Tarrant for Arrest," sworn to before a magistrate by an investigator for the Philadelphia Mar. 1960] IN RE COOPER 783 [53 C.2d 772; 3 Cal.Rplr. 14<1. 349 P.2d 956] district attorney. Each such complaint avers that "to the best of ... [the affiant's] knowledge, information and belief . . . investigation and inquiry has disclosed" that the named petitioner by dePQsiting obscene literature in the United States mail for distribution to private citizens in Philadelphia, "did do such act and acts in the said State of California which intentionally resulted in the commission of the crime of Distributing Obscene Literature in the said City and County of Philadelphia."
I would not suggest that the governor or the courts of this state, when extradition is sought, should go behind a formal charge by information or indictment in the demanding state and inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence. In re Letcher (1904), 145 Cal. 563, 564 [79 P. 65] , holds that such inquiry is not proper. However, I do believe that where, as here, it is necessary to resort to an affidavit before a magistrate in order to determine whether the accused is extraditable as one who intentionally committed an act in California resulting in a crime in the demanding state, averments on information and belief which do not state the sources of affiant's information or the grounds of his belief, are insufficient. The following considerations concerning charges against those whose extradition as actual fugitives is sought under federal statute are at least as applicable to the situation here, where the demanding state seeks the surrender of persons who assertedly committed criminal acts in this state intentionally resulting in a crime in the demanding state:
"A citizen ought not to be deprived of his personal liberty upon an allegation which, upon being sifted, may amount to nothing more than a suspicion." (Rice v. Antes (1901), 180 U.S. 371, 374 [21 S.Ct. 406,45 L.Ed. 577] .) "Charges are not verified by an affidavit that somebody is informed and believes that they are true. This is mere evasion of the law; the most improbable stories may be believed of anyone, and the man most free from any reasonable suspicion of guilt is not safe if he holds his freedom at the mercy of any man three hundred [or more than two thousand] miles off, who will swear that he has been informed and believed in his guilt." (Swart v The return of an indictment presupposes the receipt of evidence before the grand jury and the filing of an information presupposes that evidence has been appraised by the prosecuting attorney, an officer of the court experienced in evaluating evidence (and, in states with procedure such as that of California, that witnesses have been examined before a'magistrate and the magistrate has found that a public offense has been committed and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty of it). But a mere hearsay affidavit (even where, like the complaints here, it is made by an official investigator) stating that the affiant for undisclosed reasons believes that the accused committed acts in California which intentionally resulted in a crime in the demanding state, in my opinion, does not justify removal of the accused to the state wherE' the affiant has expressed such belief.
The majority say (ante, p. 778) that "in each case the [hcar:oay] affidavit and [the] indictment dovetail to meet tll(' requirements of sections 1549.1 and 1548.2." They reach this conclusion because, on their view, "It must be presumed that ... as prosecuting witnesses the affiants knew of their own knowledge that the indictments were based on petitioners' California activities" and "Under such circumstances the respective Governors were bound to know that the indictments were based on petitioners' activities set forth in the affidavits, including their acts in California intentionally resulting in crimes in Penns?lvania," It does not appear to me that the California courts must presume or that the governors of Pennsylvania and California are bound to know that, because I the affiants for unstated reasons believe that petitioners com-' mitted acts in California intentionally resulting in a crime in Pennsylvania, the indictments which contain no such averments are in fact charges based upon such asserted California acts and intentions. A sufficient charge of acts in California intentionally resulting in a crime in the demanding state is a prerequisite to extradition under section 1549.1 of the Penal Code just as a "substantial" charge of crime is a prerequisite to extradition under either section 1549.1 or section 1548.2. If the indictment wholly omitted to charge essential elements of a crime, would the majority hold that these essential elements could be "substantially" supplied by the affidavit before a magistrate, made by someone who was also a witness before the grand jury, that he believed in their existence' '1 would not.
In rejecting the contention that the affidavits are insufficient because the magistrate did not issue warrants of arrest based upon them the majority say (ante, p. 777) that the failure to issue warrants is immaterial" [s]ince the purpose of affidavits to support extradition is not to secure immediate arrests but to convince the respective Governors that extradition is justified." While I agree that the issuance of a warrant of arrest by a magistrate of the demanding state is not a prerequisite to extradition, the quoted statement of the majority seems to contain the suggestion that where an indictment, information, or affidavit (yerified complaint) before a magistrate in the demanding state is not a sufficient charge to support extradition, that procedure can nevertheless be effected if someone in the demanding state goes before a magistrate and makes supplementary "affidavits to support extradition. " I cannot agree with any suggestion that purely evidentiary affidavits not charging a crime would be sufficient to supplement a charge which is defective on its face (el. In re Davis (1945),68 Cal.App.2d 798, 809 [3] [158 P.2d 36]).
For the reasons above stated, it is my opinion that the petitions should be granted and the petitioners should be discharged from custody.
McComb, J., and Peters, J 0' concurred.
Petitioners' applications for a rehearing were denied March 30,1960. Schauer, J., McComb, J., and Peters, J., were of the opinion that the applications should be granted.
